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Abstract
New Zealand faces an impending cost spiral of public spending 
on healthcare and pensions, as well as ongoing and substantial 
payments to those out of work. None of the solutions conventionally 
proffered, such as generating markedly higher productivity growth 
or levying significantly higher taxes, seems plausible. Mandatory 
savings accounts, however, offer more promise. Ending unnecessary 
transfer payments to businesses and wealthy individuals would allow 
health, out-of-work and retirement savings accounts to be set up and 
funded for all individuals. This policy change could secure the future 
welfare needs of low earners, enhancing opportunity, dignity, choice 
and fair treatment. It would also alleviate fiscal pressures, encourage 
efficiency gains and reduce wealth inequality.
Keywords healthcare, unemployment, private savings, Singapore, 
retirement, KiwiSaver, ACC, public subsidies, inequality
Mandatory Savings
the saviour of  
New Zealand’s  
welfare state
Almost 80 years since the establishment of New Zealand’s welfare state, it faces an 
unprecedented crisis. There is widespread 
agreement that it is failing to deliver on its 
objectives. Welfare payments make up the 
single largest portion of public spending. 
Yet significant numbers of children grow 
up in poverty, most adults do not retire 
with enough capital to live in comfort, 
and homelessness is on the rise, among 
other social issues.
Future cost trends will only exacerbate 
these problems. Given current policy 
settings, future New Zealand governments 
will not have sufficient funds to ensure 
that their citizens can access high quality 
healthcare. In a ‘cost-pressure’ scenario, 
public health and long-term care spending 
in New Zealand is forecast to increase 
from 7.6% of GDP in 2015 to 15.3% by 
2060. In addition, spending on 
government superannuation, equal to 
5.1% of GDP in 2015, is forecast to rise to 
8.1% by 2050.1 In other words, these two 
areas alone will require an increase in 
funding of over ten percentage points of 
GDP over the next 30–40 years. This 
change is due to a forecast doubling of the 
retired population and, in the case of 
healthcare, to costs per person rising faster 
than GDP.
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As well as these projected increases in 
public spending, New Zealand also suffers 
from low productivity growth. Yet the view 
that welfare costs can be met by relying on 
high future rates of economic growth has 
little merit. Higher productivity growth is 
notoriously hard to achieve, and far richer 
countries than New Zealand will struggle 
to afford their welfare states. Indeed, we 
already see moves, especially on the 
political right, to constrain health spending, 
leading to rationing and lower quality 
services. Lower income earners will bear 
the brunt of these changes, as they are least 
able to access private care. Such an outcome 
is unacceptable in an age when economic 
inequality is such a pressing issue (see, for 
example, Rashbrooke, 2017).
Some would argue for greater public 
funding of the welfare state via higher taxes. 
But to the extent that those taxes fall on 
capital, New Zealand’s poor savings record 
is likely to be weakened further. Lower 
incentives to invest and build capital in a 
country already short on it will likely lead 
to lower wage growth and a reduced ability 
to fund welfare provision.
This article offers an alternative vision 
for not only the healthcare system, but also 
superannuation and out-of-work income 
provision, based around the creation of 
mandatory individual savings accounts. 
First, to set the New Zealand debate in 
context, a brief discussion of the global 
debate on the future of the welfare state is 
given. Second, a proposed policy outline, 
using New Zealand as a case study, is 
provided. Third, the impacts of the reform 
on representative New Zealanders, the 
nation’s fiscal position, inequality and 
economic incentives are discussed.
Since this article sketches how the 
reform works at a high level, the detail 
given is necessarily less than it would be in 
a more narrowly focused contribution. 
However, versions of the proposals herein 
have been elaborated elsewhere (see 
Douglas and MacCulloch, 2016).
Background
Large publicly funded welfare states are 
under pressure all over the world. The 
dependency ratio, which is the proportion 
of elderly to younger, economically active 
workers, is expected to rise in most 
nations. Severe pressures will be exerted 
on pensions and public health systems. 
The ratio of public health and long-term 
care expenditures to GDP has already been 
steadily rising. Under the OECD’s ‘cost-
pressure’ projections, these expenditures 
will almost double, reaching 14% of GDP 
by 2060 (see Figure 1). Furthermore, public 
pension spending is forecast to grow from 
9.5% of GDP in 2015 to 11.7% of GDP in 
2050 (OECD, 2013).
One of the countries that has best 
managed these kinds of pressures is 
Singapore, which provides universal 
healthcare coverage at a lower cost than any 
other high-income nation. Total health 
spending, by both government and private 
sources, is 4.8% of GDP in Singapore 
(compared to 17.2% in the United States, 
9.3% in the UK and 9.5% in New Zealand).2 
The cornerstone of Singapore’s system is 
the mandatory MediSave medical savings 
account. Although MediSave funds belong 
to the contributing worker, the government 
has guidelines as to how the money can be 
spent and holds the accounts within its 
Central Provident Fund.
Efficiency gains have arisen from the 
use of MediSave accounts due to more 
transparent pricing of healthcare services, 
less third-party funding, and 
encouragement of personal responsibility. 
By most measures, excellent health 
outcomes have resulted (Haseltine, 2013). 
For large bills that could otherwise drain 
Figure 1:  Total public health and long-term care spending ratio to GDP in 2006–10 and forecasts to 2060: 
range of estimates using sensitivity analyses for individual countries
Source: OECD, 2013
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an individual’s MediSave funds, insurance 
schemes are available. The government 
offers a low-cost scheme, known as 
MediShield, under which individuals are 
automatically insured unless they choose 
to opt out. A multi-billion dollar 
endowment fund (the MediFund) also 
exists so that low-income people can 
receive a level of care they otherwise could 
not afford, even in the most highly 
subsidised wards of public hospitals. It is 
a safety net for those who have used up 
their MediSave money and MediShield 
coverage.
One feature of the reform proposed in 
this article is the establishment of 
mandatory savings accounts to help 
individuals fund the purchase of health 
services, similar to Singapore. While this 
system may lead to efficiency gains, our 
calculations for New Zealand do not rely 
on any being made. Note that the US, 
which has a high proportion of private 
spending on healthcare, has not successfully 
contained costs. This can be partly 
attributed to the subsidy which (third-
party) employer-purchased health 
insurance plans receive. Martin Feldstein, 
for example, argues that ‘because employer 
payments for health insurance are tax-
deductible for employers but not taxed to 
the employee, current tax rules encourage 
most employees to want their compensation 
to include the very comprehensive “first 
dollar” insurance that pushes up health-
care spending’ (Feldstein, 2009).
Funding the new system
Finding the funds
Under our proposed reform, the 
government would fund mandatory 
savings accounts for all workers, from 
which people would then be able to pay 
for many of their welfare needs. (However, 
substantial provision of government 
welfare services – including New Zealand 
Superannuation – would remain in place.) 
Rather than increase taxation, the most 
sensible way to fund this spending is to 
seek savings elsewhere in the government 
budget.
Unnecessary subsidies
Existing public spending could be reduced 
by eliminating a range of subsidies 
that disproportionately benefit more 
affluent New Zealanders. These include 
subsidies to the production of films 
that are internationally focused and 
produced in New Zealand; offshore market 
development assistance to business; the 
Provincial Growth Fund; accelerated 
depreciation tax allowances available 
to businesses in the forestry, farming, 
bloodstock and research industries; and 
favourable treatment of rental housing.3
While some of these schemes may be 
argued to create benefits in terms of 
promoting economic growth, a core 
proposition of this article is that social 
welfare would be enhanced if instead the 
money was used to fund health, out-of-
work and retirement savings accounts for 
all workers. This alternative purpose would 
secure the long-term survival of a high-
quality healthcare system and enable a 
transformation of the level of retirement 
wealth (see below). Put another way, there 
are many kinds of unnecessary subsidies 
which may appear small, yet add up to 
create a large opportunity cost. Part of the 
reason turns out to arise from the so-called 
miracle of compound interest, as the flow 
of funds into the individual savings 
accounts which would be released by 
ending these schemes compounds up over 
time.
The reform proposed in this article also 
changes spending on tertiary students. In 
1992 the Student Loan Scheme was 
introduced by the government to help pay 
for tuition fees, course costs and living 
expenses. In 2006, student loans were made 
interest-free (while students continued to 
pay a subsidised fee). Subsequently, the 
present Labour-led coalition announced a 
free-fees policy for one year of full-time 
study, ultimately intended to cover three 
years. The reform proposed here reverts to 
the subsidised fee system and introduces a 
means test to restrict interest-free loans 
and grants to students from low-income, 
low-capital families. The aim is to target 
assistance where it is needed and release 
funding for the savings accounts of all 
workers.
In addition, government subsidies 
would be eliminated for the KiwiSaver 
automatic enrolment scheme for employees, 
the biggest recipients of which are better 
off New Zealanders who tend to make the 
largest contributions. Working for Families 
tax credits and power subsidies would be 
limited to less affluent families. (Some 
more affluent families may therefore 
experience a fall in disposable income, 
though they would also enjoy the benefits 
of their mandatory saving accounts, as 
detailed below.) The government would 
also stop making contributions to the 
Cullen Superannuation Fund, freeing up 
around $1 billion – the projected 
contribution in the present financial year 
– to be paid into the individual accounts. 
(The existing balance in the Cullen Fund 
could be retained for its current purpose 
of helping to pre-fund future government 
superannuation payments.)
A total of around $10 billion becomes 
available upon ending all of these kinds of 
payments.
Redirected spending
Several other forms of government 
spending would become unnecessary once 
individual savings accounts for health, 
out-of-work and retirement provision 
are introduced. Our reform instead gives 
priority to redirecting this funding into the 
individual accounts. 
We can redirect a substantial amount 
of current welfare spending, including $11 
... a core proposition of this article is 
that social welfare would be enhanced 
if instead the money was used to fund 
health, out-of-work and retirement 
savings accounts for all workers.
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billion of public health and out-of-work 
expenditure.4 In addition, a total of around 
$9 billion is currently paid by employers 
and employees to the Accident 
Compensation Corporation (ACC) and to 
KiwiSaver. Our mandatory accounts would 
replace the ACC scheme. Another $1 billion 
of funds would be required from 
individuals as a personal contribution to 
the accounts. Taken altogether, these 
savings (and contributions) amount to $31 
billion ($10 billion + $11 billion + $9 
billion + $1 billion).5
Allocating the funds
The allocation of the above funds to our 
new savings accounts is guided by a set of 
principles: 
•	 medium-term	quality	decisions	take	
precedence over quick-fix solutions;
•	 decisions	 relating	 to	welfare	 should	
identify and exploit economic and 
social linkages, so that every action will 
improve the working of the system as 
a whole;
•	 only	 large-scale	 reform	 packages	
provide the flexibility needed to 
demonstrate that losses suffered by a 
group of people from one policy would 
be offset by gains for the same group in 
some other area.
Retirement provision
First, a fresh approach to retirement policy 
would take place. To ensure that individuals 
prepare properly for retirement, it is 
proposed that the government create new 
retirement savings accounts for every New 
Zealand worker, which would replace the 
KiwiSaver scheme.6  Into these accounts the 
government would place an amount equal 
to 9 cents in every dollar of an individual’s 
earned income up to $54,000 (indexed), 
generating a maximum of $4,860 per 
year.7 These savings could be accessed only 
at the legal age of retirement (currently 
65). Note that the existing government 
pension remains and continues to be paid 
out at its current rate (with the same yearly 
adjustment).
Given that those in the bottom half of 
the income distribution have few savings, 
this reform would represent a major 
turnaround in their fortunes. Although the 
savings would be funded from existing 
general taxation and be paid into dedicated 
personal accounts over which their owners 
exercise responsibility, it has some aspects 
in common with the contributions-based 
national insurance levies used in other 
nations. A key feature of the present 
proposal is that the new contributions to 
the savings accounts have little effect on 
most workers’ disposable incomes.
The cost to government of the new 
policy would be around $9 billion, which 
would come from the $31 billion pool of 
funds detailed above, leaving $22 billion 
available.
Health and out-of-work provision (sickness, 
unemployment and accident)
Second, a fresh approach to healthcare and 
out-of-work policy could be implemented. 
Benefit levels and other assistance for the 
out-of-work would stay at present levels 
and be adjusted on the same basis as 
currently. But parallel to the above, the 
government would create mandatory 
accounts dedicated to supporting an 
individual’s health and out-of-work costs. 
Into these accounts it would place an 
amount equivalent to 24 cents in every 
dollar of an individual’s earned income up 
to $54,000 (indexed). This would generate 
a maximum of $12,960 per year. In the case 
of healthcare, in particular, rules would 
be set governing how the funds are spent. 
Annual payments into these accounts 
would total $22 billion. Individuals could 
then use them to meet the following costs:
•	 insurance	to	cover	healthcare	costs	of	
over $20,000 (indexed) per year;
•	 insurance	to	cover	the	costs	associated	
with falling out of work;
•	 a	chronically-ill	fund	contribution;	and
•	 direct	payments	for	smaller	healthcare	
and out-of-work bills.
These estimated withdrawals would 
add up to $13 billion annually, of which 
$10 billion would be for healthcare and $3 
billion for out-of-work costs. This would 
leave $9 billion annually as savings ($22 
billion – $13 billion), a sum which would 
accrue interest and could be spent on 
future healthcare and out-of-work costs. 
Within that $9 billion, around $2 billion 
would be secured as savings dedicated for 
spending on healthcare costs in retirement.
For those people who cannot afford to 
pay for their healthcare, which include the 
long-term unemployed, the government 
acts as ‘insurer of last resort’. Our proposed 
budgets retain ample public funds for this 
purpose (which is served by the MediFund 
in Singapore).8 Note that this safety net 
may come at a cost of undermining work 
incentives, due to increasing marginal 
effective tax rates. On the other hand, the 
new funding paid into the health, out-of-
work and retirement savings accounts of 
workers leads to a large build-up of wealth 
and provides a greater incentive to become 
employed (see below). 
Due to these offsetting effects, the 
number unable to support themselves from 
their savings accounts and entirely 
dependent on the state may be about 5–6% 
of the population, although firm estimates 
are hard to make. 
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Figure 2:  How government spending changes: before and after the 
‘savings-based’ reform
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How the reform works: some diagrams
Figure 2 shows how the reform affects 
spending by the government. Public 
expenditure on ‘unnecessary subsidies’ is 
ended. Instead these funds are put into 
the savings accounts. In addition, these 
accounts receive a part of the funds that 
were previously spent by the government 
on welfare, which now become available 
for spending directly by individuals.
Strikingly, the flow of funds into the 
health and out-of-work accounts enabled 
by the ending of ‘unnecessary subsidies’, 
and the subsequent accumulation of 
interest, would be sufficient to absorb the 
increases in healthcare spending forecast 
over the next decades. This result is based 
on assuming that the capital in the accounts 
accumulates at a compound rate of about 
4%, which matches the rate of increase of 
per capita public health spending since 
1980.9  The flow of funds into the retirement 
accounts also provides a rapidly 
compounding balance, available at 65.
Figure 3 shows financial flows under 
the new system. Detailed full government 
budget forecasts to 2035 are presented in 
Douglas and MacCulloch (2016), which 
shows the transition to the new scheme.
Outcomes of the reform
Individual outcomes and wealth inequality
This reform enables most workers, but 
especially low- and middle-income earners, 
to acquire their own savings accounts, 
without much affecting disposable 
incomes. Current levels of total healthcare 
spending would be retained, and could be 
increased more in the future, compared to 
the existing system. Payment for services 
can now be made out of the individual 
accounts.
More specifically, a 20-year-old may 
expect to retire after 45 years with between 
$500,000 and $1 million in their retirement 
savings account (or between $1 and $2 
million for a couple) in 2018 dollars.10 New 
Zealanders not falling within the chronically 
ill category would retire with about $150,000 
in their health and out-of-work account 
after 25 years in the workforce (as well as 
holding a healthcare insurance policy). A 
greater level of security would result. The 
system should also work more fairly in a 
broader sense. Around 70% of those in the 
workforce would be able to accumulate 
savings of $17,820 per year ($4,860 in the 
retirement account plus $12,960 in the 
health and out-of-work account) to help 
meet their current and future welfare needs 
(and the other 30% a little less).
Since the build-up in savings enabled 
by this reform can be achieved by low- to 
middle-income earners (who previously 
had little or no savings), the potential exists 
for more equitable outcomes. For example, 
Pension Payments, Education Funding a
nd Oth
er
Taxes
Figure 3: Financial flows in the new ‘savings-based’ system
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Exhibit A: Outcomes of the  
‘savings-based’ policy  
on representative  
New Zealanders
1. Existing retired
The current retired will see little change in their income under the new system.
a. The government pension remains (with the same yearly adjustment).
b. Low-income, low-capital retirees receive a yearly grant into their health 
a/c which enables them to buy a catastrophic health insurance policy and 
have funds to supplement their normal health expenditures.
2. Impact on working New Zealanders
a. The government pension equal to what is paid today and on the same 
terms will continue.
b. Individuals will also hold capital in their health/out-of-work and retirement 
savings accounts. The level of capital depends on the number of years to 
retirement and earnings.
c. An increase in retirement income.
3. Impact on out-of-work New Zealanders
a. Benefit levels and other assistance remain at present levels and are 
adjusted on the same basis.
b. Increased support by way of specialist training with the aim of improving 
life skills, putting jobless New Zealanders in a position where they have 
the skills to get a job, together with one-on-one support systems.
c. Responsibility of those who are out-of-work (where required) to attend 
practical training sessions.
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a young household of two working adults, 
sitting in the bottom quintile of the 
distribution of net household wealth, 
would likely see their new level of wealth 
upon retirement lift them into the top 
quintile.11 Much of the explanation as to 
how this outcome is achieved arises from 
the compounding returns on the capital in 
the savings accounts.
Note that rising inequality in nations 
like the US and UK (led by the ‘top 1%’) 
has recently been blamed on the return to 
capital exceeding the economic growth rate, 
together with a high concentration of 
capital among the rich. It has consequently 
been suggested that capital taxes should be 
raised (see Piketty, 2014). The present 
article offers an alternative: namely, the 
removal of unnecessary subsidies to release 
a flow of funds into savings accounts over 
the lifetime of all workers, enabling them 
to establish their own compounding source 
of wealth.
Furthermore, individuals would gain 
more power to decide when, where and by 
whom they get medical help and how 
much capital and income they have in 
retirement, instead of those decisions being 
made by politicians. These choices would 
be constrained by rules governing the 
workings of the savings accounts (one 
would expect people to be given full 
freedom to draw down their retirement 
account once they reached 65). In this way 
the reform should bring a greater level of 
choice, and with it more independence, 
opportunity and fair treatment, compared 
to the present system.
Since individuals would now purchase 
their own services it becomes harder for 
institutions (e.g., hospitals) to capture 
resources, since different providers would 
need to compete harder. The income of 
providers, whether public or private, would 
depend more on their services than on 
meeting third-party reimbursement 
formulas. Price information and 
negotiation become a vital part of the 
healthcare and insurance marketplaces. To 
help facilitate this outcome, there 
necessarily would be strong regulations 
governing the healthcare insurance market 
place (to avoid the problems prevalent in 
the US system). The present article does 
not, however, assume that private provision 
leads to more efficiencies. In Singapore, 
public and private hospitals coexist, 
although most healthcare is directed by the 
government to the public side. The public 
hospitals are dominant in the sense of 
offering an extremely high quality of care 
at affordable prices and setting the ethos 
for the entire system, though the private 
system is seen as necessary to challenge it. 
The public system, in turn, serves to keep 
private costs in check.12 
Funding the shift in New Zealand to 
the new system would create winners and 
losers. Losers comprise special interest 
groups that presently benefit from the 
‘unnecessary subsidies’ (as listed above). 
These include the beneficiaries of film 
subsidies and high-income/high net wealth 
families in receipt of interest-free student 
loans and free tertiary fees. Winners are the 
recipients of the savings accounts, which 
are set up for every New Zealand worker. 
If efficiencies result from the new system, 
and are sufficiently large, then of course 
the number of losers would be reduced. 
Exhibit A provides more details of how the 
reform affects different types of people.
Fiscal outcomes
Table 1 shows figures from the government 
budget, and adds in the KiwiSaver and ACC 
schemes. In the forecast 2019 financial year, 
the New Zealand government expects to 
receive $86.7 billion in tax revenues. In 
addition, individuals and employers make 
$9 billion of other payments (levied to 
support health costs, ACC and KiwiSaver), 
yielding a total of $95.7 billion of available 
funds.
At present, $76.7 billion is spent by the 
government on mainly welfare-related 
purposes (like health, out-of-work, 
education and superannuation), whereas 
$10 billion is spent on purposes that are 
referred to as ‘unnecessary subsidies’ in this 
article. The total of (non-unnecessary 
subsidies-related) spending is $80.7 billion 
($76.7 billion + $4 billion of ACC 
payments). Under the new regime, funds 
are allocated differently. Of total revenues, 
$31 billion is transferred into the savings 
accounts for health, out-of-work and 
retirement. Government spending reduces 
Table 1:  New Zealand’s existing government budget, plus ACC and KiwiSaver, 
compared to a savings-based budget: 2019 forecast
(1) Existing budget 
($ billions)
(2) Savings-based 
budget ($ billions)
Revenues
Taxation (personal, corporate, GST) – 
government 86.7
Taxation and contributions to health, out-of-
work and retirement savings accounts 96.7
Contributions to fund mainly ACC and 
KiwiSaver accounts by employees and 
employers 9.0
Total 95.7 96.7
Expenditures
Health, pensions, out-of-work, education 
and other – government 76.7 65.7
‘Unnecessary subsidies’ to high earners – 
government 10.0
Healthcare and out-of-work savings 
accounts 13.0
Payments from ACC fund 4.0 2.0
Total 90.7 80.7
• Government cash balance 0 0
• Health, out-of-work and retirement 
savings accounts balances 18
Notes: In column (1) the change in government cash balance is 0 (=$86.7bn–$76.7bn–$10bn). In column (2), total contributions 
to health, out-of-work and retirement savings accounts equal $31bn (out of $96.7bn revenues). Hence the change in the 
government cash balance is 0 (=$96.7bn–$31bn–$65.7bn) and the change in the savings accounts balances is $31bn–
$13bn=$18bn. The $1 billion difference in revenues between the Existing and the Savings-based budgets reflects the additional 
funds, outlined above, which are required from individuals as contributions to their savings accounts. 
Source: Treasury, 2018
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to $65.7 billion. However, $13 billion is 
spent from the accounts, made up of $11 
billion to compensate for the drop in 
government funding of health and out-of-
work costs, plus another $2 billion 
previously spent from the ACC fund 
(which is phased out).
Under the new policy, a total of $80.7 
billion continues to be spent on (mainly) 
welfare-related activities ($65.7 billion + 
$13 billion, plus an additional $2 billion 
from the old ACC fund). In all, $18 billion 
becomes savings in the personal accounts, 
available for future spending on health/
out-of-work and retirement.
Over time, the reform would lead to 
improvements in the government’s fiscal 
position, due, in particular, to the build-up 
of interest earned on the savings accounts, 
which enables people to cover rising 
healthcare costs without putting pressure 
on the government’s budget constraints.
Conclusion
Many nations are forecast to struggle to 
fund their welfare states over the coming 
decades. Although governments will be 
hard pressed to maintain present levels 
of (per capita) welfare generosity, private 
savings rates have been falling. In this 
article, a reform is proposed that would 
enable the government to fund savings 
accounts of individuals with little effect on 
disposable incomes. We use a case study 
of New Zealand, although our reform 
could be applied to other places. It would 
especially help low- and medium-income 
earners to establish significant levels of 
(non-housing) capital. It may even lead to 
productivity gains, especially in healthcare. 
The fiscal viability of the welfare state 
would be secured, while ample public 
funds are retained to ensure universal 
coverage.
1 For a lower projected increase, calculated on a different 
basis, see Rosenberg, 2017.
2 The healthcare expenditure figure of 7.6% of GDP quoted for 
New Zealand in the Introduction refers to public spending. 
Once private expenditures are also included, the figure rises 
to 9.5%.
3 The ‘favourable treatment’ to the owners of rental housing 
arises from the tax deductibility of their expenses and 
mortgage interest payments.
4 Current public spending on health and out-of-work redirected 
into the accounts would focus on types of funding where 
individuals were better placed to spend the funds directly 
themselves, rather than the State doing so on their behalf.
5 These figures are based on Treasury (2018) forecasts for 
2019.
6 The balances in existing KiwiSaver accounts would simply be 
added to the new mandatory retirement accounts.
7 This cut-off is chosen since it is close to average earnings. 
The proposed reform in this article is designed to help all 
workers establish significant personal savings. However, 
such help stops at $54,000. If higher income earners wish 
to spend additional funds on their welfare needs, above 
what is held in the mandatory accounts, then it would be 
out of their own pockets.
8 For the 2018/19 year, healthcare spending by the New 
Zealand Government is forecast to be about $19 billion. 
Since $10 billion of this budget now goes into health 
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which would have a high redistributive component, for 
subsidising the health-care of those unable to pay out of 
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9 See Ministry of Health, 2010. Public health spending 
increasing at a greater rate than GDP is associated with an 
increasing proportion of GDP spent on healthcare. Provided 
the return on our savings accounts is higher than the growth 
rate of GDP (and is close to the rate of increase of health 
spending), the present proposal is able to help resolve the 
potential future funding crisis in the health system. For 
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the growth rate, see Piketty, 2014.
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with $1.2 million in their retirement account (assuming a 
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quintile of the net wealth distribution in New Zealand have 
less than $43,000, with a median of $9,000 (mostly held 
in mortgaged real estate). Since the cut-off point for the top 
wealth quintile is $1.07 million, such a couple would retire 
with a net wealth that placed them in the top quintile given 
this reform (see Statistics New Zealand, 2018).
12 On whether health services should be publicly or privately 
provided see, for example, Besley and Coate, 1991.
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